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This Article begins by considering four situations in which foreign constitutional
law might be relevant to American constitutional law. It concludes that foreign
constitutional law is most relevant to good policy-making or to assessments of
reasonableness and least relevant to questions of interpretation. The Article then
goes on to consider whether Supreme Court cases arising under Section One of
the Fourteenth Amendment call for interpretation or an assessment of the
reasonableness of state laws. I conclude that as an original matter, the
Fourteenth Amendment does not confer an open-ended power on the Court to
assess the reasonableness of state laws and that only state laws which violate
rights that are deeply rooted in history and tradition violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. Laws against sodomy do not violate rights that are deeply rooted in
history or tradition. The Article then considers whether such laws should be
struck down under a doctrine of desuetude or a doctrine offorbidding selective
prosecution because they are sporadically enforced by state executives. The
Article concludes that neither the argument from desuetude or about selective
prosecution should avail Lawrence in this case. The Article then considers
whether sexual orientation should be a suspect classification under equal
protection doctrine and concludes it should not. Finally, the Article considers
whether it would be cruel and unusual punishment to impose prison sentences on
gays for having sex, and I conclude that this would be cruel and unusual
punishment. Since in Lawrence, however, the only punishment imposed was a
small fine, I conclude there is no Eighth Amendment problem on the facts of this
case.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I write separately to note that the law before the Court today "is... uncommonly
silly." If I were a member of the Texas Legislature, I would vote to repeal it.
Punishing someone for expressing his sexual preference through noncommercial
consensual conduct with another adult does not appear to be a worthy way to
expend valuable law enforcement resources.
Notwithstanding this, I recognize that as a member of this Court I am not
empowered to help petitioners and others similarly situated. My duty, rather, is to
"decide cases 'agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States."'
And, just like Justice Stewart, I "can fid [neither in the Bill of Rights nor any
other part of the Constitution a] general right of privacy," or as the Court terms it
today, the "liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent
dimensions."1
The key constitutional issue of the last 100 years has been whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment gives the Supreme Court the power
to judge de novo the reasonableness of state laws. The high Court answered that
question affirmatively in 1905 in Lochner v. New York2 and again in June 2003 in
Lawrence v. Texas.3 In both cases, the Court found that the state laws burdened
key liberty interests of the petitioners, and placing the burden of proof on the
States, the Court held that the States had not succeeded in meeting the burden of
showing that its criminal laws were reasonable.4 Under this Lochner/Lawrence
approach to substantive due process, a lot of state laws could fall as being
unreasonable.
Happily, for most of the period between 1905 and 2003, the Court has been
substantially more restrained in its construction of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. For example, in its landmark decision, United States v.
Carolene Products in 1938, the Court announced that most reasonableness review
under the Due Process Clause would be done under the rubric of rational basis
scrutiny with the utmost deference to legislative judgments.5 The only exceptions
I Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605-06 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527, 530 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting)) (citation
omitted).
2 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58-60 (1905).
3 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-79. See also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
575, 583 (1996) (applying, in effect, a reasonableness test to punitive damages under the Due
Process Clause). It seems possible to me that the result in BMW could have been reached under
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment as incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment, thus obviating any need for reasonableness review here.
4 RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CoNsTITUrTIoN: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 214, 334 (2004); see also Lochner, 198 U.S. at 69-74; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-79.
5 United States v. Carolene Prods Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
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to this rule of deference in Carolene Products were for cases in which the Bill of
Rights was concerned, a law burdened a discrete and insular minority, or a law
closed off the democratic processes of political change.6 Over the sixty-five years
since Carolene Products, the Court observed its rule of judicial deference quite
rigidly in cases involving economic rights and less rigidly in cases involving
social issues in which the Court again began to experiment with judicial activism
after its decision in Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965.7 The Court's dabbling with
judicial activism reached gale force in Roe v. Wade in which the Court struck
down the anti-abortion laws of all fifty states in an embarrassingly weak opinion
that was based solely on the Justices' normative view that those laws were
unreasonable. 8
Roe was one of the worst Supreme Court decisions in American history both
because of its sanctioning of an extreme form of judicial activism and because of
its harmful consequences for millions and millions of unborn children. It deserves
to stand with Dred Scott9 in the pantheon of great and harmful abuses of power
by the U.S. Supreme Court. ' 0 After Roe, a strong political reaction to the Court's
abuses of power succeeded in reigning in the Court's activist tendencies. In
leading cases, such as Bowers v. Hardwick, in which the Court declined to
recognize a right on the part of gays to engage in sodomy,"I and Washington v.
Glucksberg, in which the Court declined to recognize a right to assisted suicide,12
the Court again staked out a moderate and restrained position for discovering
new, constitutionally-protected, fundamental rights. Basically in Bowers and
Glucksberg, the Court said that it would strike down state laws under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if they violated the Bill of
Rights or some unenumerated, fundamental right that was deeply rooted in the
nation's traditions. 13 This very tame and domesticated form of reasonableness
review seemed to be triumphant after the Court's 1997 decision in Glucksberg, so
much so that Professor Michael McConnell hopefully predicted after Glucksberg
that "the Roe era [had come] to an end.' 14
6 Id at 152 n.4.
7 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
8 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973).
9 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
10 See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress
Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1551-67 (2000).
11 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986).
12 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997). See also Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Courts should look at history at the most specific level of
generality available in finding new fundamental rights.).
13 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.
14 Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997
UTAH L. REv. 665, 666 (1997).
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The decision in Lawrence raises many fascinating questions, but perhaps the
most urgent one is: What does its overruling of Bowers portend for the future of
reasonableness review under the Due Process Clause? Does Lawrence mean that
the Roe-era or the Lochner-era is back? There certainly can be no question that
rhetorically Lawrence bears no relation whatsoever to Glucksberg. Whereas
Glucksberg promised that the power of judicial review would only be used
cautiously to protect fundamental rights deeply rooted in the nation's history and
traditions, Lawrence could be read to suggest that state morals laws that cannot be
proven reasonable may be unconstitutional. If one takes the doctrinal language of
Lawrence seriously, then the case certainly does seem to signal a rebirth of
vigorous Lochner-style substantive due process. 15
I think it is a mistake to take the language of either Lawrence or Glucksberg
too seriously right now. It seems to me that we are in the middle of a war that has
gone on for thirty years, since the decision in Roe v. Wade, 16 over whether this
nation is going to be governed by a committee of nine, life-tenured lawyers or
whether it is instead going to be governed by the people's elected representatives
in the states. Lawrence and Glucksberg are merely battles in this great struggle,
and neither one signifies that one side or the other has definitely won. Lawrence is
a clear victory for the forces of judicial activism, but it is tempered by the fact that
Lawrence is a far less activist decision than Roe, at least in terms of its practical
effect.
To begin with, Roe struck down the abortion laws of all fifty states, while
Lawrence struck down the anti-sodomy laws of only thirteen states and most of
those laws were unenforced. In this respect, Lawrence more nearly resembles
Griswold v. Connecticut17 than it does Roe v. Wade.18 As in Griswold, the
Lawrence Court essentially conducted a mopping up operation, invalidating
unenforced state laws from an earlier era that had long since ceased to have
popular support. In the forty years prior to Lawrence, anti-sodomy laws had been
repealed or held unconstitutional by state courts in thirty-seven states1 9-- one state
shy of the three-quarters it takes to amend the Constitution! Thus, whereas Roe
launched a revolution in abortion rights, Lawrence largely confirmed a revolution
in the rights of gay people that had already happened. In Roe, the Court was
leading the charge; in Lawrence, the Court was validating a change that had
already largely occurred. For this reason alone, it would be wrong for the foes of
judicial activism to greet Lawrence with despondence.
15 See BARNETT, supra note 4, at 334.
16 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18 Roe, 410 U.S. at 166.
19 State Supreme Courts struck down anti-sodomy laws in Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842
S.W2d 487, 491-92 (1993); Powell v. Georgia, 510 S.E.2d 18, 25 (1998); Campbell v.
Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 262 (1996).
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More fundamentally, a court that could decide Glucksberg unanimously
seven years ago and that could then split 6-to-3 in Lawrence is not a court with a
stable majority viewpoint: It is a court in flux. When one factors in that at least
three Justices are now at retirement age-Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor-
and that there has been no change in the Court's membership in a decade, it
becomes clear that it is highly premature to declare that Lawrence signifies much
of anything. At most, Lawrence is a sign of what the Court could become if, for
example, John Kerry had won the 2004 presidential election.
In this respect, the opaque opinion in Lawrence has functioned much like a
judicial Rorschach test onto which people have projected their own hopes and
fears. Thus, Randy Bamett2° and Richard Epstein 2' have acclaimed Lawrence as
heralding the revival of Lochner, while Justice Scalia has gloomily predicted that
it heralds the end of all state morals legislation. 22 As likely as not, they are all
wrong. Lawrence probably portends nothing more than another step in the
ongoing victory of the forces of gay rights in this country. A victory that is also
portended by President George W. Bush's quiet decision not to repeal the
Clinton-era executive order barring discrimination against gays in federal
employment matters. A nation which protects gay federal employment rights
when a conservative republican is in the White House probably does not have
much desire to imprison gay people for having private sexual relations. Indeed, on
July 9, 2004, while campaigning in Pennsylvania, President Bush said specifically
of gays: "'What they do in the privacy of their house, consenting adults should be
able to do.' ... This is America. It's a free society. But it doesn't mean we have to
redefine traditional marriage. '23 This is hardly a full-throated cry of opposition to
gay rights!
There is, however, one feature of the Lawrence opinion that will be of lasting
significance and that is its citation to foreign constitutional law sources as
authority in construing the meaning of Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment.24 Specifically, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion for the Court
cites the Wolfenden Report to the British Parliament, the European Court of
Human Rights decision in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,25 and to cases following
20 See RANDY BARNETT, JUSTICE KENNEDY'S LIBERTARIAN REVOLUTION: LAWRENCE V.
TEXS 12-14 (Boston Univ. School of Law, Working Paper No. 03-13, 2003).
21 Richard A. Epstein, Of Same Sex Relationships and Affirmative Action: The Covert
Libertarianism of the United States Supreme Court, 12 S. CT. ECON. REV. 75, 76 (2004).
22 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23 Carl Hulse, Senate Democrats Offer Early Vote on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, July 10,
2004, at AI3.
24 For another thoughtful discussion of this issue, see Joan Larsen, Importing
Constitutional Norms from a "Wider Civilization ": Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court's Use of
Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J.
(forthcoming 2004).
25 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. 40 (1981).
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Dudgeon, such as P. G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom,26 Modinos v. Cyprus,27 and
Norris v. Ireland.28 If the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court relying on foreign
sources of law to interpret the meaning of Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment takes hold, it will portend a revolution in American constitutional
law jurisprudence.
Therefore, in this short Article, I want to look at the Lawrence opinion with a
primary focus on the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and on
when, consistently with originalism, the Supreme Court is authorized to rely on
foreign constitutional law. I will begin in Part II with a discussion of a variety of
situations in which one might look to foreign constitutional law as a solution to
problems of domestic constitutional law. Then, in Parts III, IV, and V, I consider
whether foreign constitutional law is in fact relevant to Justice Kennedy's
fundamental rights opinion (Part III), Justice O'Connor's equal protection opinion
(Part IV), or an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment argument that
was not actually made in the Lawrence case (Part V). I conclude that foreign
constitutional law opinions are of some relevance to a handful of issues in
American constitutional law, but not to the vast bulk of our constitutional
jurisprudence. I conclude, in particular, that the Court erred in Lawrence in
relying on foreign sources of constitutional law, and I express the hope that the
Court will not do that again in the future.
II. WHEN IS IT APPROPRIATE TO RELY UPON FOREIGN CONSTITuTIONAL
LAW?
The Lawrence opinion's reliance on foreign sources of constitutional law was
open and direct. While the majority technically tried to imply that it was merely
rebutting Chief Justice Burger's references in Bowers to the history of Western
civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards,29 the fact of the
matter is that the Court said that Lawrence's claim was not "insubstantial in our
Western civilization." 30 Justice Scalia's dissent notes that the majority did not
take account of the many jurisdictions, including the entire Islamic world, which
disapprove of homosexuality, and he derided the majority for its "dangerous
dicta," whereby the majority sought to 'impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions
on Americans.' 31
26 P.G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44787/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Sept. 25, 2001),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/.
27 Modinos v. Cyprus, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. 485 (1993).
28 Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186 (1988).
29 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
30 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
31 Id. at 598 (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)).
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Evaluation of the use of foreign legal opinions in American constitutional law
requires that we first consider which of four different situations we face vis-d-vis
reliance on foreign law. First, foreign law might be used in the law-making or
policy-making context. Second, foreign law might be said to be relevant to an
assessment of reasonableness or unusualness that American law requires courts to
make. Third, foreign law might be said to be relevant for questions of the judicial
role. And fourth, foreign law might be said to be relevant in interpreting a phrase
or clause of the U.S. Constitution. It is my thesis that the desirability and
appropriateness of looking to foreign constitutional law is different in each of
these four situations, which I will now address in turn.
A. The Law-Making Process
First, foreign constitutional law doctrines might be said to be relevant in the
law-making process. That is to say, they might be relevant to the writing of
constitutions, constitutional amendments, or leading statutes. Law-making
involves, by definition, the making of public policy, and such policy-making can
always be informed and improved by considering how other groups of civilized
people handle the same issue.
For this reason, comparative constitutional observations have always played a
part in deliberations over the writing of a new constitution. Thus, in ancient times,
there were comparative compilations of the fundamental laws of each of the
Greek city states. In the 1780s, when the U.S. Constitution was being written and
ratified, the framers of the Constitution frequently compared that document with
the fundamental governing rules applicable in Great Britain32 or to countries on
the European continent. Thus, the Federalist Papers contain a discussion that
compares the newly proposed American federation to other federations known to
European history.33 Another one of the Federalist Papers compares the American
president's powers to the powers of the king of Great Britain and the governor of
New York.34 All of these comparative observations are, in my judgment, quite
valid ones. In making a new constitution, people should study what has worked
and failed in other civilized countries. It is for precisely that reason that the
American constitutional example has been justly influential over the past fifty
years as Germany, Japan, Italy, Spain, Russia, and the countries of Eastern
Europe have all rewritten their constitutions.
Comparative observations are likewise relevant when a country is debating
whether or not to adopt a constitutional amendment. In considering, for example,
the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, I think it was surely relevant that the
overwhelming majority of civilized foreign jurisdictions forbid sex discrimination
32 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2661-63 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33 THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 18, 19, 20 (James Madison & Alexander Hamilton).
34 THE FEDERALIST, No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
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in their constitutions.35 Similarly, in considering the proposed amendment to
legalize voluntary prayer in schools, I think it is relevant that voluntary prayer in
schools is allowed in the overwhelming majority of foreign jurisdictions.36 The
passing of constitutional amendments involves the making of policy, and
comparative observations are always relevant to the question of what is good
policy.
Finally, comparative observations may be relevant when Congress or a state
legislature is deciding whether or not to pass a major statute. It is thus relevant to
the debate over school vouchers that the overwhelming majority of foreign
jurisdictions allow government aid to go to religious schools37 and to the debate
over assisted suicide that legalization of suicide led to abuses in the Netherlands.
Similarly, Congress could have taken into account in passing the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act the fact that most foreign jurisdictions protect free
exercise of religion rights more vigorously than the U.S. Supreme Court. In sum,
the case that comparative observations are relevant to the U.S. is at its strongest
with respect to policy-making issues.
B. Determinations of Reasonableness
A second context in which foreign court judgments might be relevant is when
one is interpreting provisions of the U.S. Constitution that provide open-ended
considerations of "reasonableness." Two provisions of this kind immediately
come to mind-the Fourth Amendment, which bans "unreasonable searches and
seizures" 3 8 and the Eighth Amendment which bans "cruel and unusual
punishments" and "excessive" fines or bail.39 These clauses are worded at a high
level of abstraction and were arguably intended, as an original matter, to have
some evolving content. By calling for a modem day assessment of what searches
are reasonable or what punishments are cruel and unusual, these clauses seem to
invite us to look at contemporary practices both in the United States and in other
Western legal systems that are closely related to our own.
In trying to determine what punishments are cruel and unusual, all nine
Justices of the Supreme Court have agreed upon a "nose-counting" approach,
whereby the question of, say, capital punishment for the mentally handicapped is
35 For example, Article 11, Section 2 of the German Basic Law provides that "Men and
women shall have equal rights." DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 344 (1994).
36 See, e.g., id. at 253-55, 344 (citing Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the German Basic
Law).
31 See generally id. at 267.
38 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
39 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Necessary and Proper
Clause).
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said to depend on how many states have outlawed it.40 This count is said to reflect
how "unusual" the punishment is. I agree that this nose-counting inquiry is
entirely appropriate, although it may not always be dispositive of constitutional
meaning. And, I strongly suspect that the framers of the Eighth Amendment
would have looked to, say, the barbaric practices of the Spanish Inquisition in
saying that such tortures as "the rack," or the use of "thumbscrews," or "drawing
and quartering" were unconstitutional.
If the practices of the Spanish Inquisition are relevant to determine what
punishments are cruel and unusual, then the contemporary practices of other
civilized nations with respect to executing the mentally handicapped are relevant
too. The Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments directly
calls on us to figure out what punishments are "unusual," and it is a mistake to say
that that inquiry should proceed with no attention to contemporary practice in at
least Britain, and probably France, Germany, Italy, and Spain as well. I sincerely
doubt that James Madison or Alexander Hamilton would have insisted that
"unusualness" be measured without any reference to the practices of Western
European nations closely related to our own.
C. Questions as to the Judicial Role
A third category of situations in which foreign legal judgments might be said
to be relevant is in assessing questions of the judicial role. Many American
academics, for example, say it is judicial activism for the Supreme Court to
enforce constitutional federalism boundaries or the non-delegation doctrine. Here,
it is certainly of interest that, for example, the German Constitutional Court
vigorously enforces federalism 4' and the non-delegation boundary lines in
German Constitutional law.42 The fact that playing umpire to the structural
constitution is a permissible role in German law is certainly interesting, but, at the
end of the day, it does not really tell us anything about the meaning of the phrase
"the judicial Power,"43 which is the power our Constitution confers on our
Supreme Court. The answer to the interpretive question of what the words "the
judicial Power" mean can be reached only by studying American, and to some
degree British, legal history.
It is for this reason that Justice Scalia was right in Printz v. United States to
chide Justice Stephen Breyer for his observation that executive branch
commandeering is allowed in German constitutional law.44 Breyer's observation
is not relevant to the question of whether the American Constitution can be
40 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312-17 (2002).
41 CURRIE, supra note 35, at 101.
42 Id at 125-34.
43 U.S. CONST. art. IH.
44 Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 921 n. I (1997).
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interpreted, presumably by divining the meaning of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, as giving the American Congress the power to commandeer state
executive officials. Breyer's observation also overlooks the fact that the German
states have a powerful tool with which to fight back against federal
commandeering-a tool which the American states lack. That tool is the fact that
in Germany the state legislatures continue to this day to elect the Upper House of
the German National Legislature, while in this country the states have lacked that
protection since the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment.
D. Matters of Interpretation
This then leads to the fourth context in which foreign legal judgments might
be said to be relevant to American constitutional law and that is in interpreting
key clauses of the U.S. Constitution such as, say, the First Amendment's
protection of freedom of speech45 or the Fifth Amendment's protection against
uncompensated "takings" of private property.46 On this issue, I would take a hard
line position and join Justice Scalia in saying that foreign constitutional law tells
us very little about how to interpret the original meaning of concrete clauses in the
American Constitution. Foreign nations, like Germany, have their own traditions
with respect to free speech or takings clause issues, and their constitutions are
often written differently than ours. Since I agree with Scalia that the decision of
cases or controversies usually involves the interpretation of text and not the
making of public policy, I also agree with him that foreign court decisions are
mostly not relevant to matters of interpretation. Figuring out the original meaning
of the Free Speech or Takings Clauses requires asking what certain words meant
in their ordinary public usage in the United Sates some 200 years ago. There is
little reason to think that any contemporary foreign court decision could shed light
on that issue.
In sum, I basically think foreign court decisions are relevant to policy
making, but not to interpretation. If one agrees with Justices Scalia and Thomas,
as I do, that most of what the Court does involves interpretation and not policy-
making, then one will think foreign court decisions are usually not relevant to the
Supreme Court. On the other hand, if one agrees with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
Stevens, Souter, Rehnquist, Kennedy, and O'Connor that what the Supreme
Court does is basically make public policy and not interpret the text, then foreign
court judgments will be very relevant indeed. Unfortunately, as this 7-to-2
breakdown suggests, Americans are highly likely to see a lot more reliance on
foreign court judgments in the years ahead.
45 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4 6 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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M. THE COURT'S OPINION IN LAWRENCE
I want to turn now to Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence and ask whether
under his individual rights approach, it was appropriate for the Court to cite foreign
sources of constitutional law in interpreting Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This turns out to depend on whether Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes a reasonableness requirement on the states-as Lochner and
Lawrence both imply-whereby state laws that are unreasonable exercises of the
police power can be struck down. 47 If the Fourteenth Amendment does contain
such a reasonableness requirement, then it would be likely that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment might have intended the practice in closely-related
Western countries to inform American constitutional practice as well. As it turns
out, Justice Kennedy is just wrong that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a
Lawrence-style reasonableness requirement on state legislatures. Showing why
this is so will require a short excursion into the history and original meaning of
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Section A, I will consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment
substantively bans the kind of anti-sodomy laws struck down in Lawrence. The
inquiry here is whether the Constitution requires state laws to be reasonable such
that the jurisprudence of foreign countries becomes relevant. Then in Section B, I
will consider whether the enforcement of the Texas anti-sodomy statute against
Lawrence was unreasonable either because of desuetude or because Lawrence was
selectively prosecuted in violation of the Due Process Clause. I conclude that in
neither of these two circumstances is Texas's prosecution of Lawrence rendered
unconstitutional.
A. Substantive Due Process Analysis
The clause of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment upon which Justice
Kennedy relies is the Due Process Clause, which provides "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 48
Justice Kennedy never gets beyond the word "liberty" in this clause. He grandly
declares that "liberty" includes not only the right to engage in sodomy, but also
"'the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life.' ,49 Of course, the Due Process Clause does not
protect this liberty absolutely. It, in fact, says one can be deprived of liberty so
long as the government acts "with due process of law."50 Justice Kennedy never
tells us directly what he thinks this latter phrase means, but his Lawrence opinion
47 See, e.g., BARNErT, supra note 4, at 331-34 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment
does impose such a reasonableness requirement).
48 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
49 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
50 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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strongly suggests that he reads it to mean that deprivations of liberty can only be
accomplished by laws that federal judges deem to be "reasonable." '5'
Whatever the policy merits of Justice Kennedy's reading of the Due Process
Clause, as an original, historical matter, it is nonsense. The Due Process Clause is
derived from a clause in the Magna Carta-the per terrum leges clause-which
said essentially that no one could be deprived of life, liberty, or property except
"by the law of the land."'52 The words "due process of law" and "by the law of the
land" were thought to be synonyms to each other until at least the 1850s, if not
beyond.53 Therefore, when John Lawrence's liberty to engage in sodomy was
denied by the State of Texas's anti-sodomy statute, he was deprived of liberty but
the deprivation was perfectly constitutional because it was by the law of the land.
Lawrence v. Texas is thus an easy case under an originalist reading of the Due
Process Clause: There is no reasonableness requirement in the Due Process
Clause, and the Clause's only purpose was to prevent arbitrary executive
deprivations of life, liberty, or property, which were the deprivations that might
occur in violation of the "law of the land." The Due Process Clause should never
have been read as being a constraint on arbitrary law-making; it is only a
constraint on arbitrary and capricious action by executive personnel, such as the
king's sheriffs. 54 Under an originalist reading of the Due Process Clause, then
there is no requirement that legislation be "reasonable." There is, therefore, no
occasion to consult foreign constitutional law to determine whether that
legislation is reasonable.
Analysis cannot end at this point for a good originalist, however, because
there is another clause in Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment that is a far
more plausible basis for unenumerated individual rights-the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.55 This Clause provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States."'56 The Privileges or Immunities Clause was gutted by the Supreme Court
in 1873 in the Slaughterhouse Cases,57 but for a good originalist like me that does
not matter. The question thus arises whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause
protects unenumerated individual rights or whether it imposes a reasonableness
requirement on the states.
5' See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-79.
52 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 378-79 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); see also Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510-27 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
53 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAw 31-32 (1990).
54 In England, due process was a restraint on executive officials' arbitrariness but not on
Parliament. Any valid enacted statute in England was given the force of law by courts.
55 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
561 d.57 The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74-79 (1873).
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On its face, the Privileges or Immunities Clause appears to protect a category
of fundamental rights (called "Privileges or Immunities") from abridgment
("lessening") by the making or enforcing of any state law.58 The Clause does not,
at first glance, then seem as if it imposes a reasonableness requirement on state
law. Rather, it seems as if it protects fundamental rights, however derived, from
abridgment.
Examination of the history of the Privileges or Immunities Clause confirms
that this is in fact how the Clause should be read. The historical evidence suggests
that the framers of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, in fact, thought the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was the most important Clause in the
amendment. 59 They borrowed its language from Article IV of the original
Constitution, which says "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." 60
The history of the original meaning of this Clause is very complex and is best
laid out in a superb law review article by John Harrison,61 but for present
purposes suffice it to say that most of the framers understood the meaning of the
words "Privileges or Immunities" as it had been defined in the dicta of a rambling
opinion of Justice Bushrod Washington in a case called Corfield v. Coryel162 in
which he explained what the words "Privileges and Immunities" meant in Article
V of the original Constitution. Justice Washington's dictum was quoted over and
over again by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment63 and so his words bear
focusing on here. In Corfield, Justice Washington said:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right,
to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed
by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of
their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental
privileges are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate.
58 John Harrison has provided the leading originalist account of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992).
59 Id at 1408-10.
60 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
61 Harrison, supra note 58.
62 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
6 3 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 28
(1980) ("[T]he framers of the Fourteenth Amendment adverted repeatedly to an interpretation
given its Article IV counterpart by Justice Washington... in the 1823 case of Corfield v.
Coryell."); Harrison, supra note 58, at 1398 ("the most famous Comity Clause case of all, one
that was often quoted in 1866: Corfield v. Coryell"); id at 1416 ("the leading authority on the
substance of privileges and immunities, Corfield v. Coryelf'); id (Senator Trumbull describes
the Black Codes as abridging the rights mentioned by Justice Washington in Corfield.).
2004] 1109
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads:
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness
and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly
prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to
pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture,
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to
take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption
from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state;
may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of
citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges
deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added, the elective franchise, as
regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to
be exercised.64
There are several passages in the material quoted from Justice Washington's
opinion which must be emphasized here. First, Justice Washington made it clear
that "Privileges and Immunities" is an expression that is confined to those rights
"which are, in their nature,fundamental.. ..- 65 He said these fundamental rights
belong to "citizens of all free governments" and they "have, at all times, been
enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the
time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. 66 It is thus crystal clear
under Justice Washington's approach to privileges and immunities in Corfield
that it is not enough for a right to be recognized in 2003 by other free
governments, like Canada, Great Britain, and the European Union. Rather, the
right must also be one that has been enjoyed by the citizens of the United States
since 177667 or at least since the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868.
Justice Washington made it clear in Corfield that privileges and immunities are,
as the Supreme Court said in Glucksberg, rights which are "fundamental" and
"deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition." 68 Since it is crystal clear that
the states have prohibited sodomy since colonial days, there can be no question as
to what Corfield implies for the outcome in Lawrence: There is no right to engage
in sodomy that is deeply rooted in the nation's history and traditions.
There is a second statement in the famous Corfield-dicta which also suggests
that Lawrence is wrong. Justice Washington said that even fundamental rights,
which are deeply rooted in the nation's history and traditions are "subject
64 Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52 (emphasis added).
65 Id (emphasis added).
66 Id. (emphasis added).
67 1 say 1776 instead of 1787 because that is when the 13 states became "free,
independent, and sovereign" in Justice Washington's words. Id at 551.
68 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
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nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the
general good of the whole."69 This passage suggests that state exercises of the
police power with a strong historical pedigree remain permissible even if a
fundamental right is burdened thereby. Once again, it is noteworthy that the states
have had morals laws since before 1776 and they have certainly regulated
sodomy since that time. Nothing in the drafting history of the Fourteenth
Amendment suggests that it was designed to allow federal courts to throw out
state morals laws that in no way discriminate on the basis of race or some other
forbidden criterion. Accordingly, under the approach laid out by Justice
Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, it seems crystal clear that Lawrence was
wrongly decided.
It must be noted, however, that there is one significant hitch in the argument
made thus far, which makes the question of Lawrence's rightness much closer
than the analysis above suggests. The hitch is that Justice Washington may well
have been wrong in his interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV as he described it in Corfield. Thus, when the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment relied on the authority of Corfield, they may well have been relying
on an erroneous opinion!
To see why this is so, we must look at the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV to see what that clause may well have meant as an original matter.
The Clause in question appears in Article IV, Section 2, which provides "The
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
in the several States." 70 This language, which was borrowed from the Articles of
Confederation, at a minimum prohibits states from discriminating against out-of-
staters with respect to privileges and immunities. 71 One logical and very
plausible, textual reading that might be given to the Clause is that it dictates that
out-of-staters should have the same rights in State A as do citizens of State A.
Thus, if State A allows its own citizens to contract to buy cigarettes at age
seventeen, it must extend the same right to visiting citizens of State B, even if the
buying of cigarettes at age seventeen is not a fundamental right that dates back to
1776.
In Corfield v. Coryell, the issue was whether an out-of-state citizen had a
constitutional right under the Privileges and Immunities Clause to harvest oysters
69 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
70 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
71 It is theoretically possible that the Clause was more than merely an anti-discrimination
clause and that it protected absolutely a category of fundamental rights called "Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several states." There has been some debate over whether the
Clause should be given an anti-discrimination reading or a protecting individual rights meaning,
but this debate leads us well beyond the purview of this article. Compare Harrison, supra note
58, with Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193
(1992).
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on the same terms as in-state citizens.72 The issue this raised is whether the
Privileges and Immunities Clause requires a state to give out-of-staters the same
rights to state parks, natural resources, and properties as in-state citizens. Justice
Washington wisely intuited that the answer to this question must be "no."'73 A
state's property and natural resources belong to that state's citizens, and it seems
completely implausible that in protecting out-of-staters from discrimination, the
framers meant them to equally share the wealth and property of all the states with
citizens of all the other states. Surely, if that had been the framers' intent, there
would have been extended discussion and controversy about the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV during the ratification debates, which there was
not.
Justice Washington ought to have decided Corfield by simply saying that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause allowed discrimination in oyster-fishing
property rights because rights to state property were not privileges and
immunities. Instead, he took the remarkable step of saying (in very famous dicta)
that privileges and immunities were only those rights that were fundamental and
dated back to the founding of the republic. This dicta, if accepted, means that
states can discriminate against out-of-staters with respect to, say, their ability to
make certain contracts or own certain property, so long as no "fundamental"
privilege or immunity, which goes back to the founding of the republic, is
invaded. But, this is not what the Clause says; the Clause does not protect out-of-
staters from discrimination, only against things that were rights under long-
standing positive state law. It also protects them against discrimination against
things that have become privileges and immunities more recently under state law.
Thus, if say the State of Vermont, in the modem era, decides to allow two of its
own gay citizens to enter into a civil union, then it must extend the same privilege
to two out-of-state gay people, even though the right in question only became
established under state law relatively recently.
The point I am driving at is that the privileges and immunities protected
under Article IV may well have been meant to be an evolving category of rights,
rather than a category of rights whose meaning was fixed in 1776, according to
Justice Washington. If the point of the Clause was to protect out-of-staters from
all discrimination by State A, it is hard to see why the Clause would protect out-
of-staters only with respect to things that were rights under positive state law in
1776 and not those things that have become rights under positive state law more
recently.
If the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV has content that could
evolve over time, then it seems possible that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment has a meaning that can evolve over time as well.
Furthermore, if the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
72 Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 550-51.
7 3 Id at 552.
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Amendment can evolve over time, than perhaps it has evolved to the point at
which the right to engage in private oral and anal sex has become a privilege or
immunity. The argument that it has is that whereas in 1960 all fifty states
outlawed sodomy, by 2003 only thirteen states continued to outlaw it, and those
laws went almost entirely unenforced. 74 And, critically for this Article, if the
Privileges or Immunities Clause is an evolving reasonableness clause, then it
might be relevant what the practice concerning gay sex is in Britain, Canada, or
the European Union. Thus, the rejection of Justice Washington's Corfield dicta
would tend to validate Justice Kennedy's reliance on foreign sources of law in
Lawrence, just as it would have supported Justice Peckham's reasonableness
requirement in Lochner v. New York.75
Reading the Privileges or Immunities Clause as if it has evolving content and
requires states to pass only reasonable laws might give the U.S. Supreme Court
the power to bring jurisdictional outliers into line with the national consensus.76
Arguably, this is what the Court did in Lawrence in which it struck down thirteen
unenforced state laws to bring those states in line with the other thirty-seven. The
Court clearly did the same thing in Griswold v. Connecticut in which
Connecticut's anti-birth control law was an oddity in the nation at the time
Griswold was decided.77 More ominously, the Court did the same thing in
Lochner v. New York in which New York's progressive law outlawing labor for
more than sixty hours a week was a jurisdictional outlier in 1905.78 Today, other
such jurisdictional outliers might be Oregon's law legalizing assisted suicide (one
state only), Vermont's law legalizing civil unions for gays (two states only), and
Califomia's law legalizing the medical use of marijuana (eight states).79 All of
these laws are rejected in three-fourths of the states, the number Article V requires
to amend the Constitution, just as three-quarters of the states rejected
Connecticut's birth control law in Griswold and as (almost) three-quarters of the
states rejected anti-sodomy laws in Lawrence (thirty-seven out of fifty).
The argument that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment should have evolving content is just plain wrong, however. While I
think a good case can be made that Justice Washington bungled the interpretation
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV in Corfield, this does not
change the fact that it is Washington's bungled interpretation that inspired the
74 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
75 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
76 Professor Michael Klarman of the University of Virginia School of Law made this
point in a faculty workshop at Northwestern Law School in April 2004. Michael Klarman,
Speech at Northwestern Faculty Workshop (April 2004).
77 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,480 (1965).
78 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,45-47 (1905).
79 See, e.g., Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, No. 03-
1454, 2004 WL 875062 (U.S. June 28, 2004).
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framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. The phrase "privileges and/or
immunities" was a legal term of art when the Fourteenth Amendment was being
written and by then most framers of the Amendment thought that the phrase
meant what Justice Washington had wrongly said it meant.80 For a moderate
originalist like me, the question must be what was the public meaning of the legal
term of art "privileges and/or immunities" in 1868, and as best as I can determine,
Justice Washington had carried the day with his wrong opinion in Corfield by the
1860s. This means two things: 1) privileges or immunities must be deeply rooted
in our nation's history and tradition; and 2) they are even subject to "such
restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the
whole."81 Under this analysis, Lawrence is wrong, and the Court ought never to
have cited foreign court judgments or laws.
There are two other reasons for reading the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment in this way. The first is given in the
Slaughterhouse Cases in which Justice Miller rightly feared a broad reading of the
Clause that would turn the court into a perpetual censor of the reasonableness of
state laws.82 If the Fourteenth Amendment clearly compelled such a reading then
perhaps it would make sense to let the fifty-two words of the second sentence of
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment trump the whole structure of
federalism, which the original Constitution creates in thousands of words. In fact,
however, the Fourteenth Amendment does not contain a clear statement that it
mandates reasonableness review or that privileges or immunities was meant to be
an evolving concept. Given that and the enormous stakes involved, the Court is
right to limit the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of unenumerated rights to
those that are deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition.
This is especially the case because giving the Supreme Court the power to
strike down outlying state laws stifles innovation and prevents the states from
competing with each other and serving as laboratories of experimentation. 83
Sometimes striking down outliers is widely popular and thus harnless, as was
certainly the case in Griswold v. Connecticut.84 Had the Court not acted, very
little would have changed. Connecticut would have either repealed its anti-birth
control law or continued to not enforce it, and no other state would have passed a
similar law. But other times, as in Lochner v. New York,85 the Court may stop a
valuable social experiment that is in fact an outlier, which is a harbinger of the
80 See ELY, supra note 63, at 28-29.
81 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
82 The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 78 (1873).
83 See Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers ": In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 777 (1995); see also New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
84 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
85 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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future. In that case, the Court may slow down democratic processes of change to
a very substantial extent and a real crisis may arise until the Court overrules itself.
While it seems very likely that Lawrence is the Griswold-kind of outlier, rather
than the Lochner-kind of outlier, this is dangerous turf for the Court to be on. If
Lawrence-style outlier correction takes hold, many valuable social experiments
by the states may be brought to a premature end.
In sum, neither the Due Process Clause nor the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment impose a requirement that state legislatures
can pass only "reasonable" laws. Accordingly, the correct method for identifying
constitutionally-protected, unenumerated rights under these Clauses is to look for
rights that are deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition from either 1868
or in 1776.86 This inquiry is not enhanced but is harmed when the Supreme Court
looks at foreign sources of constitutional law. Accordingly, the Court was
mistaken to look at those sources of law in Lawrence.
B. Desuetude and/or Selective Prosecution
We have already seen that the Privileges or Immunities Clause applies to
state legislative law-making and that it protects only fundamental, historically
rooted rights. We have also seen that the Due Process Clause was not meant, as
an original matter, to trump arbitrary and capricious (i.e., unreasonable) state
legislation. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does,
however, ban arbitrary or capricious executive action, and there are two claims of
that sort which Lawrence had available to him that require our consideration and
discussion. The first is the claim that Lawrence effectively had no notice under
the Due Process Clause of the illegality of his conduct because anti-sodomy laws
were simply never enforced either in Texas or in any of the twelve other states
that had not yet repealed them. The claim here would be that the Texas law had
become unenforceable by desuetude, at least in the absence of some public notice
by Texas prosecutors that they were going to start enforcing the Texas anti-
sodomy law again.87 The second, and related, due process argument would be
that Lawrence was arbitrarily and capriciously singled out for prosecution when
no one else in his situation was being prosecuted. Here, the claim might be that
Lawrence was, in effect, selectively prosecuted.88 I will discuss each of these
claims in turn.
The desuetude argument was first made by Alexander Bickel in defending
the Court's invalidation of Connecticut's anti-birth control law in Griswold v.
86 See supra note 67 (explaining use of 1776 instead of 1789).
87 For a discussion, see Cass Sunstein, Liberty After Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059
(2004).
88 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S.
448,456 (1962); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
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Connecticut.89 The claim is that due process entitles individuals to notice that
their conduct is unlawful before they can be prosecuted, and when a law goes
unenforced for decades, its sudden enforcement against an individual, like
Lawrence, deprives him of notice that his conduct was something the state could
legally punish.90 This argument for desuetude is one of the strongest arguments
that can be made in defense of the Court's result, if not its opinion, in Lawrence.
Whatever the merits of this argument in Griswold, it is a less strong argument
to raise in defense of the Court's outcome in Lawrence. The fact is that whereas
there was no political support for anti-birth control laws for married couples in
1965, there is substantial debate about the merits of gay rights in the United States
in 2003. No gay man or woman was really under any illusion that a substantial
proportion of the public was of the view that gay sex is always right.91 Moreover,
while attitudes on this point are clearly changing, the public remains very
skeptical of gay marriage. Even the Clinton Administration, which was otherwise
very pro-gay rights, continued the ban on gays serving in the military with a
"don't ask, don't tell policy"92 and President Clinton signed into law the Defense
of Marriage Act.93
Against this backdrop, it is hard to say that Lawrence had no notice that if he
openly violated the Texas anti-sodomy law, he might be subject to some kind of
punishment, a punishment that in fact turned out to involve not jail time but a
minimal fine.94 Gay rights is a bitterly contested issue in the United States today,
and it is well known that Texas and other southern states do not want to recognize
gay rights. While those states do not enforce their laws against gay sex, they are
not without legal effect. They can be cited in cases involving adoption of children,
employment by state agencies, and rights to equal housing. I personally do not
think criminally prosecuting gays, as Texas was doing, makes sense, and I think
the anti-sodomy law was an inappropriate use of the criminal justice system. But,
the issue for due process purposes is not whether we like the Texas anti-sodomy
laws, or the somewhat benighted reasons the state had for keeping its anti-sodomy
law. Rather, the due process question is only whether gays had notice that if a
police officer observed them having anal or oral sex in their own house they could
89 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 148-56 (1962).
90 Id.
91 A national sample of 2,765 adults showed: 53% of public thinks gay sex is always
wrong; 5% thinks it is almost always wrong; 7% wrong only sometimes; 32% not wrong at all;
4% do not know. NAT'L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, SURVEY: FEB. 6
TO JUNE 26, 2002 (2002) available at www.ropercenter.unconn.edu (last visited Oct. 22, 2004).
92 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994).
93 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c) (1996).
94 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563. I think the desuetude argument might have carried the day
had Texas given Lawrence a sentence of any prison time because more definite notice ought to
be required for deprivations of liberty than for de minimus fines.
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be subjected to a de minimus fine and not jail time. I have no real doubt that
Lawrence was on notice of this small risk when he engaged in anal sex the night
he was arrested.
But, perhaps the most fundamental flaw with the desuetude argument for
Lawrence is that it cannot support an opinion any broader than one that would tell
Texas that if it wanted to keep its anti-sodomy law, it would have to issue a press
release indicating that any person observed by the police violating that law was
henceforth subject to criminal prosecution. I have no doubt Texas would have
been willing to issue such a press release, given that the State defended its anti-
sodomy law all the way up to the Supreme Court. Thus, a desuetude opinion
might overturn Lawrence's misdemeanor conviction, but it would not lead to an
opinion enshrining a constitutional right to gay sex. Since the enshrining of such a
right is the essence of what Lawrence is all about, one cannot defend the case
solely on a desuetude rationale.
One might try to save the desuetude argument by claiming that all laws that
go unenforced for many years cannot be resurrected with the issuance of a press
release, but must be re-passed by the state legislature. This would, in effect,
mandate a constitutional sunset rule for all unenforced laws-federal and state.
Such a rule seems to me eminently sensible as a matter of policy, but it is hardly
one that is deeply rooted in our history and traditions. Sunset desuetude then is
just another appealing policy argument for a result that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not mandate.
The second and related due process issue is whether Lawrence was
selectively singled out for prosecution by law enforcement officials in Texas.95
The question is was it arbitrary and capricious for Texas law enforcement to
prosecute Lawrence for having anal sex when many other gay people in Texas,
and straight people in other states, were having anal or oral sex and going
unpunished. The question is thus whether there is something about Lawrence's
conduct that justifies singling him out and prosecuting him when others similarly
situated were not being prosecuted. The most recent leading Supreme Court
opinion on selective prosecution is United States v. Armstrong.96 It holds that to
make out a claim of selective prosecution the "claimant must demonstrate that
the... prosecutorial policy 'had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated
by a discriminatory purpose.' 97 "To establish a discriminatory effect.., the
95 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S.
448, 456 (1962); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (A defendant may
demonstrate that the administration of a criminal law is "directed so exclusively against a
particular class of persons... with a mind so unequal and oppressive" that there has been "a
practical denial" of equal protection of the law.).
96 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 456.
97 Id. at 465 (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
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claimant must show that similarly situated individuals... were not prosecuted. 9 8
It is necessary for the person claiming selective prosecution to make a threshold
showing that similarly situated individuals have not been prosecuted to get further
discovery, which may prove helpful against the prosecution.99
This selective prosecution claim, like the desuetude claim, is a relatively easy
issue to resolve. The fact of the matter is that in Lawrence someone called the
police and asked them to come investigate a breach of the peace at Lawrence's
house.' 00 The police came and observed Lawrence engaged in anal sex.101
Lawrence made no effort to conceal what he was doing, and he thus may have
invited his arrest. Indeed, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that Lawrence
deliberately got himself arrested for violating the Texas anti-sodomy law so as to
generate a case with a constitutional challenge to that law. It is well known that
something similar to this happened in Griswold v. Connecticut.10 2
The bottom line is that there is a reason for singling Lawrence out and
treating him differently from others in this case. The difference is that Lawrence
was observed by police officers having anal sex while most people in Texas who
engaged in that conduct manage not to be seen by the police doing it. There is
nothing in the record suggesting that Lawrence knew of other gay or straight
people who were observed by the police having anal sex who were not
prosecuted. Thus, Lawrence falls far short of being able to make the threshold
showing for selective prosecution, which United States v. Armstrong 0 3 requires.
The prosecution of Lawrence was not arbitrary and capricious. Rather, it was
consistent with the notion that public law-breaking is especially harmful and
deserving of prosecution.
There undoubtedly are cases in which the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment renders laws unenforceable because of concerns over
lack of notice--desuetude--or selective prosecution, but Lawrence is not such a
case. Lawrence was not in fact the victim of arbitrary or capricious executive
misconduct. Since the executive did not behave "unreasonably" in Lawrence,
there is once again no reason to consult foreign constitutional law as a measure of
"unreasonableness."
IV. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor concurred, specifically rejecting the majority's
due process, individual-rights rationale and based her concurrence instead on an
98 Id.
9 9 1d. at 458.
100 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
101 Id. at 563.
102 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
103 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 458.
1118 [Vol. 65:1097
LAWRENCE: AN ORIGINALIST REAPPRAISAL
equal protection rationale. 10 4 The questions thus arise whether: 1) Justice
O'Connor is right that the Texas anti-sodomy law at issue in Lawrence falls under
the Equal Protection Clause; and 2) whether foreign sources of law ought to be
relevant to this question.
The original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's anti-discrimination
guarantee was to outlaw systems of caste-based discrimination like those enacted
by the infamous Black Codes, passed in many southern states after the end of the
Civil War in 1865 and 1866.105 These codes reduced the newly freed slaves to
second class citizens by abridging their right to make contracts, own property, and
testify in court as compared to white citizens. 10 6 The Black Codes, in effect,
created two classes of citizens in the United States: an upper caste of whites and a
lower caste of African Americans. A central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was thus to eliminate such a system of class-based hierarchy from
our laws by rendering it unconstitutional. The framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment thought this anti-discrimination principle was enacted by both the
Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, 10 7 but for more
than a century now the Supreme Court has identified the principle with the Equal
Protection Clause alone. 0 8
Everyone agrees that the anti-discrimination principle of the Fourteenth
Amendment renders all racially discriminatory laws subject to strict scrutiny such
that they can only survive if they are supported by a compelling governmental
interest. 10 9 Sex-based discrimination is subject to middle-level scrutiny,' 10 or
perhaps something more stringent,"' and ordinary laws are usually upheld if they
104 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
105 Harrison, supra note 58, at 1388-89; id. at 1410 (Senator Howard says the equal
protection clause would "abolish all caste legislation."); id at 1412 ("The rhetoric of general
equality was also common in the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment."); id. at 1413 (Senator
Howard explains that "the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to... 'abolish[] all class
legislation in the States and [do] away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a
code not applicable to another."'); id. at 1424 (abridging of privileges or immunities occurs
when rights are taken "away through unequal legislation"); id at 1458 (The Privileges or
Immunities Clause recognizes "the existence of ad hoc castes, such as the owners of foreign
cars."); id. at 1458 ("the Fourteenth Amendment requires caste-blindness with respect to
privileges or immunities of citizens"); id at 1460-62 (other caste-based discrimination
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment includes discrimination on the basis of religion,
politics, and possibly sex).
10 6 PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 241-42 (2000).
107 Harrison, supra note 58, at 1387-88.
108 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879).
109 E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1967); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
326 (2003).
110 E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973).
111 E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
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are supported by a rational basis. 12 Thus, the first question that arises under anti-
discrimination law is whether laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation should be subjected to heightened or middle-level scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has extended heightened scrutiny so that it applies to all
laws that discriminate on the basis of race and not only to those which
discriminate against African-Americans. 1 13 The Court has also said that laws that
discriminate on the basis of national origin or ethnicity are treated identically to
those that discriminate according to race.11 4 Since the 1970s, the Court has
engaged in extended debate over whether to extend the principle of no caste-
based discrimination to apply to laws that discriminate on the basis of sex. The
Court has correctly struck down most sex-based classifications that it has
reviewed,115 while upholding a few sex-based classifications, particularly the
requirement that only men must register for the draft.1 6 The sex discrimination
cases, which are decided correctly in my view, make it clear that some forms of
"discrimination" or systems of "caste" may be invalid under the Fourteenth
Amendment even if the distinctions those laws make were not viewed as
discriminatory in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted. "17
An initial question for all originalists is whether any extension beyond race,
national origin, and ethnicity of the anti-discrimination rule is valid. Assuming the
Fourteenth Amendment outlaws "systems of caste" was it permissible for the
Supreme Court to extend that ban to laws that make sex discriminations? I think
the answer to that question is "yes." The Fourteenth Amendment's outlawing of
"systems of caste" is no where limited in the text of the amendment to only racial
systems of caste. In this respect, the Fourteenth Amendment is both broader and
less specific than is the Fifteenth Amendment, which specifically mentions only
racial discrimination in voting as the kind of discrimination that was outlawed." 8
If Celtic Irishmen are protected by the no-caste principle of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as the Court specifically said they were in Strauder v. West
112 E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); United States. v. Carolene
Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
113 E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,
270 (2003).
114 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) ("Nor if such a law should be
passed excluding all naturalized Celtic Irishmen, would there be any doubt of its inconsistency
with the spirit of the amendment.").
115 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 581 (1996).
116 See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 74-75 (1981); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S.
53, 73 (2001).
117 See Harrison, supra note 58, at 1461-62.
'
18 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
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Virginia,1 9 it is hard for me to see why, given public attitudes since the
Nineteenth Amendment was ratified in 1920, women should not also be protected
by the no-caste principle. After all, ever since the 1964 Civil Rights Act outlawed
sex discrimination in employment, 120 distinctions on the basis of sex have been
regarded by most Americans as somewhat suspect and indicia of "caste." The
country came very close to passing the Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA") to the
constitution in the 1970s. It is arguable that a major reason why that amendment
failed was because the Court itself had already applied middle-level scrutiny to
laws that discriminated on the basis of sex, 121 thus taking the wind out of the
ERA's sails. The rejection of the ERA may justify the Court leaving a few laws in
place that discriminate on the basis of sex, particularly in the context of the
military and of separate-sex bathrooms, but I think it is fair to say that since the
1970s an overwhelming majority of Americans have understood sex
discrimination to be a form of caste discrimination outlawed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The argument for treating sex discrimination as a form of the caste-
discrimination outlawed by the Fourteenth Amendment is essentially the same as
the argument for saying that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishments outlaws whippings or beatings even though those punishments were
allowed in the 1790s. In both cases, broad constitutional prohibitions have been
understood to apply beyond the core application that originally stimulated their
enactment as part of the Constitution. While a full discussion of this point would
require a separate article, I am persuaded as a moderate originalist that the no
caste-based discrimination principle of the Fourteenth Amendment outlaws the
overwhelming majority of laws that discriminate on the basis of sex.
The issue thus that is raised by Justice O'Connor's concurrence is this: Has
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation today become a form of caste-
based discrimination that is outlawed by the Fourteenth Amendment? 122 This is a
serious question about which serious people with good intentions disagree.' 23 We
appear to be headed down the road toward recognizing that sexual-orientation
discrimination is caste-discrimination, but, as a federal regime, we are clearly not
yet at that point. Gays have made major strides in recent years, most dramatically
with their attainment under President Clinton of a prohibition on discrimination
against them in federal governmental hiring decisions. As I mentioned above, this
119 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) ("Nor if a law should be passed
excluding all naturalized Celtic Irishmen, would there be any doubt of its inconsistency with the
spirit of the amendment.").
120 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994).
121 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973).
12 2 JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 162-64 (1980).
123 Compare ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN LAW 129-34 (2002), with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 578, 586-605 (2003)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 629 (1996).
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prohibition has been retained by President Bush, a conservative republican who
now publicly supports the right of gays to have consensual sex, 124 and this
strongly suggests that public opinion is shifting in favor of gay rights. Moreover,
between 1960 and the 2003 decision in Lawrence, thirty-seven states plus the
District of Columbia either repealed or invalidated their proscription on oral and
anal sex.125 If current trends continue, it is quite possible that at some point in the
not too distant future sexual-orientation discrimination may come to be regarded
as a form of the caste-discrimination that is outlawed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
It is at this point that the evidence from democratic foreign constitutional
regimes becomes relevant. The fact that the European Convention of Human
Rights and the Canadian Constitution have been interpreted as barring sexual
orientation discrimination is in my view relevant to the question of whether
sexual orientation discrimination is banned by the no caste-discrimination
principle of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is clearly a stronger view among
western democracies that sexual-orientation discrimination is impermissible, than
there is such a view that discrimination against polygamists or practitioners of
adult incest is unconstitutional. But, it is a long leap from the statement that this
evidence is relevant to the proposition that the United States Supreme Court
should take sides in the culture war raging in this country over gay rights by
outlawing discrimination against gays. There are at least three reasons why I do
not think it is appropriate at this point for the U.S. Supreme Court to build on its
decision in Romer v. Evans126 and find the no caste-based discrimination
principle applicable to sexual-orientation discrimination.
First, the countries which are signatories to the European Convention of
Human Rights and Canada are countries that are noticeably less religious and
more secular than the United States. Religion is a major force in American public
life for the good, in a way that it is not a force any longer in the public life of
France, Germany, or Canada. Americans of faith are disproportionately opposed
to homosexuality, in part because of the proscriptions against it in the Old and
New Testaments. Opinion polls reveal that a substantial number of Americans
continue to believe that homosexual sex is a sin, even though the Bible obliges us
to love the sinner while hating the sin.127 I think it would be a serious abuse of
power, in light of these views held by a substantial number of Americans, for the
U.S. Supreme Court to read protection for sexual-orientation discrimination into
the no caste-based discrimination principle of the Fourteenth Amendment. 128
124 See Hulse, supra note 23 and accompanying text.
125 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
126 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626 (1996).
127 See Sunstein, supra note 87.
128 The principle that there should not be national rules on matters of religion and morality
is arguably embraced in the Establishment Clause, which was originally intended to prevent a
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Second, there is another textual principle in addition to the no caste-based
discrimination principle that is fundamental to the Constitution: the principle of
federalism. We live in a federal republic in which people in different regions have
notoriously different views on social and cultural issues. Opposition to gay rights
is especially strong in the more religious parts of the country, particularly the
south. At the same time, some other parts of the country, like Massachusetts and
New England, are very much in favor of gay rights with Massachusetts even
experimenting with gay marriage. 129 Against this backdrop, I think it would be a
mistake for either the secular northeast or the more religious south to impose its
views on the rest of the country by fiat. There are issues on which federations
cannot stand divided, as Abraham Lincoln famously said, citing Jesus, 130 but gay
rights is not such an issue. As long as there have been empires in the world there
has been more libertarianism on social and cultural values in cities than there has
been in the hinterlands. This is a fair way in my judgment of handling the gay
rights issue. Gay Americans who wish to escape moral opprobrium can live in the
major sections of the country that are secular and be free of discrimination of any
kind. Americans of faith should have the same right to form and live in
communities where their moral values are not declared unconstitutional by
unelected judges. Those who choose to live in a part of the country where their
views on homosexuality are in the minority should learn to gracefully put up with
a prevalence of opposing views. In my judgment, there should be no national rule
enacted by the courts whatsoever on gay rights.131
Third, I mentioned above the sweeping decriminalization of gay sex, which
occurred in this country between 1960 and 2003, and I now feel compelled to
mention a reason why that decriminalization ought not to have led to Lawrence.
There is a big difference between supporting the decriminalization of something
and making it into a new national right. One can feel that it is not a good use of
the criminal law to punish gay sex and still disapprove of homosexuality. No one
would say that the legalization of state lotteries over the last forty years means
there is today a national right to gamble. Similarly, no one should argue that the
legalization of gay sex means Americans are indifferent to homosexuality. The
crucial majority of Americans want to tolerate gays without saying they have
nationally established religion from displacing the established state churches. AKHIL REED
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 32-33 (1998).
129 Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,948 (Mass. 2003).
130 Matthew 12:25.
131 The policy questions raised by the Defense of Marriage Act are beyond the purview of
this article, but I feel I should say that I do not think states are obligated by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to recognize any gay marriages performed by other states. I favor the extension of
Title VII to gays with a special exception for people whose faith compels them to view
homosexuality as a sin. I favor a limited Federal Marriage Protection Amendment that would
provide only that the marriage law of each state should be determined by the legislature thereof
and not by the state courts.
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society's wholesale approval for their lifestyle. In other words, a majority of
Americans want a policy of "Don't ask, Don't tell." There is nothing in the
Constitution that forbids a majority of Americans from taking this approach.
These three reasons also explain why Texas's anti-sodomy law does not fail
the equal protection rational basis test as explicated in the Court's decision in
Romer v. Evans, which struck down a Colorado initiative that forbade
municipalities from protecting gays from discrimination in their civil rights
ordinances. 132 The Colorado initiative was the first law of its kind, and it totally
lacked the historical pedigree possessed by anti-sodomy laws. Texas's anti-
sodomy law, in contrast, is supported by Biblical teachings that go back
thousands of years, and thus while one may disagree with it, one can hardly
dismiss it as irrational without enacting a form of secular humanism as our state
civil religion.' 33 This kind of anti-clericalism has no place in a religious country
like the United States and runs contrary to principles of federalism. Whatever the
merits of the Court's decision in Romer-and I believe that case was wrongly
decided-the traditional rational basis test of Williamson v. Lee Optical 34 and of
United States v. Carolene Products135 is easily satisfied by a law which bans
homosexual relations. The Jewish and Christian teachings with respect to
homosexuality may be disagreed with, but it is dishonest and disrespectful to say
that they are irrational.
Finally, these three reasons explain why Professor Andrew Koppelman is
wrong when he argues that Texas engages in sex discrimination when it precludes
Lawrence from having anal sex with a man that he could legally have with a
woman. 136 There are still some differences which the law attaches to men and
women, for example, draft registration and the role of women in combat being
high among them. Sex classifications still do not receive strict scrutiny, although
they must meet higher hurdles than ever before. 137 Forbidding men from having
sex with men and women from having sex with women is not unconstitutional
sex discrimination, because there are sound religious, moral, and federalism
reasons for thinking that some states might want to discourage these relationships
in accord with Biblical teaching and millennia of actual societal practice. While
132 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
133 Today's liberals invoking the rational basis test think that Biblical teachings that are
thousands of years old and are supported by the teachings of Thomas Aquinas are "irrational"
whereas Marxist inspired economic regulation is perfectly okay, even though socialism has
been overwhelmingly revealed to be a failure both globally and at home. It is important to
remember that the rational basis test invoked in Romer has nothing whatsoever to do with what
beliefs are actually "rational."
134 Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,489 (1955).
135 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
136 KOPPELMAN, supra note 123, at 208; Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination
Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 211 (1994).
137 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555-56 (1996).
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Professor Koppelman's argument is a clever one, it fails in the face of centuries of
practice opposing any right of gays to have sex and also because sex
classifications are not yet subject to strict scrutiny.
In sum, I think foreign constitutional law is relevant mainly to the issue of
whether sexual orientation discrimination is a form of caste-discrimination
outlawed by the Fourteenth Amendment, but for three reasons I think the foreign
evidence ought not to carry the day. First, Americans are more religious and less
secular than Europeans and Canadians, and our Constitution protects the right of
religious Americans to enact their views into law. Second, we are a federation
with different social views to an extent that is not the case in Europe and Canada,
and for that reason too, we ought not to have one court-imposed rule on social
questions. And, third, the decriminalization of gay sex over the last forty years
should not be read as a condoning of gay sex. Not everything that is made legal
becomes a "right." For all of these reasons, I think foreign sources of
constitutional law are not dispositive of the question of caste-based discrimination
under our own unique constitutional structure. I also think the Texas law easily
satisfies the traditional rational basis test of Williamson v. Lee Optical 38 and of
United States v. Carolene Products.139
V. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
CONSIDERATIONS
The final issue raised by the Lawrence opinion is whether it is cruel and
unusual to punish gay people criminally for having sex with one another. Justice
Powell raised this issue in his famous concurrence in Bowers v. Hardwick in
which he said that a prison sentence, certainly a substantial prison sentence for
having gay sex, would have for him raised issues under the Eighth Amendment's
ban on cruel and unusual punishments. 140 I agree with Justice Powell on this
point, given the Court's current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
The leading case decided by the Supreme Court recently on the scope of the
Eighth Amendment is Atkins v. Virginia'4' and, in the context of non-capital
cases, the leading recent decision is Ewing v. California,142 upholding
California's so-called "three strikes and you are out" law. In Atkins, the Court
revisited its 1989 decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, which had held that it was not
cruel and unusual punishment for a state to execute a person who was mentally
retarded. 143 The Atkins Court began its analysis by noting that the Eighth
138 Williamson, 348 U.S. at 489.
139 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152-54.
140 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197-98 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
141 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
142 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003).
143 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 321 (1989).
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Amendment bans excessive fines and bail and the Court stated that the
amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments should be interpreted with
this same proportionality precept in mind. 144 The Court relied in this holding on
Weems v. United States, decided almost a century ago, in which a punishment of
twelve years jailed in irons at hard labor was deemed excessive for the crime of
falsifying records, 145 and on Robinson v. Califomia in which imprisonment for
90 days was deemed excessive for the status of narcotics addiction. 14 6 The Court
approvingly cited Justice Potter Stewart's statement in Robinson that "[e]ven one
day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a
common cold."1 47
At the outset, an orginalist must note that the text of the Eighth Amendment
is ambiguous as to whether the amendment outlaws "excessive punishments" as
the Court has held repeatedly. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted."' 148 One could draw either of two conclusions from the fact
the word "excessive" appears with respect to bail and fines but not punishments.
One could conclude that the framers meant there to be a proportionality rule for
bail and fines, but not for punishments, or one could construe the word "unusual"
as being a synonym for "excessive." The Court has done the latter, for the most
part, since Weems in 1910, and I must say this is the reading of the constitutional
text that seems most plausible to me. It is hard for me to imagine that the framers
could have meant to enact a proportionality rule for property matters like bail and
fines, but not for criminal punishments involving loss of life or liberty.
Accordingly, I start my Eighth Amendment analysis by assuming that there is a
proportionality principle in the amendment, as the Court has said for a hundred
years, that applies to all criminal punishments, even those in non-capital
punishment cases.
In making this argument, I disagree with Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and
Thomas who have argued in Harnelin v. Michigan or Ewing v. California that
144Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.
145 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910).
146 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,667 (1962).
147 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, at 667 (1962)).
148 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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the proportionality principle should be limited to capital punishment cases
only.' 49 They believe the proportionality test is incapable of principled judicial
application, 150 and so they claim the courts should always defer to the
legislature's judgments about proportionality. Justice Scalia defends this claim as
part of his larger defense of rules over proportionality standards as being more in
keeping with the commands of the Rule of Law. 151
The first problem with Justice Scalia's proposal to confine the proportionality
test to non-capital cases is that it finds absolutely no support in the text of the
Eighth Amendment. The Amendment simply does not distinguish between
capital and non-capital cases as to a proportionality principle, and therefore a
good textualist like Scalia ought not make such a distinction either. Moreover,
Justice Scalia's reading of the Eighth Amendment as not including a
proportionality principle has been rejected by the Supreme Court's case law for
almost 100 years since Weems was decided in 1910. Given that his position is
counter-textual and is rejected by precedent, it seems to me that the Court is
obligated to conduct at least a deferential proportionality analysis even in non-
capital cases. Finally, Justice Scalia's opposition to the proportionality principle
has also been rejected by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, the swing voters on
the current Court, who refuse to close the door to a narrow proportionality rule in
non-capital cases 152 and whose views are shared in this respect by Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor quite
properly note that outside the context of capital punishment applications of the
proportionality principle should be made only in very rare and compelling cases
but arguably, for reasons I will set out below, Lawrence is such a case. For all of
these reasons, I am persuaded that an Atkins-style proportionality review is
appropriate in Lawrence even though it is a non-capital case. I will therefore
proceed to analyze Lawrence using an Atkins analysis.
In Atkins, the Court reaffirmed that "[a] claim that punishment is excessive is
judged not by the standards that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided
over the 'Bloody Assizes' or when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by
149 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994 (Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing that the proportionality principle is "an aspect of our death penalty jurisprudence, rather
than a generalizable aspect of Eighth Amendment law"); Ewing, 538 U.S. 11, 32 (2003)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
150 Other leading cases on the proportionality principle in recent years include Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,288 (1980) and Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983).
151 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989);
see also Tennessee v. Lane, 72 U.S.L.W. 4371 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152 Justice Kennedy's views are expressed in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-
97 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Justice O'Connor's
views are expressed in her plurality opinion in Ewing for herself and Justices Rehnquist and
Kennedy.
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those that currently prevail."' 153 The Court quoted and again relied upon Chief
Justice Earl Warren's statement in Trop v. Dulles that "[t]he basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man .... The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 154 Recent examples of the
Court doing this were Coker v. Georgia, in which the Court found the death
penalty for rape to be excessive, 155 and Enmund v. Florida, in which the Court
invalidated the death penalty as excessive for a criminal who neither took life,
attempted to take life, nor intended to take life. 156
The Court in Atkins observed that when Penry v. Lynaugh upheld the death
penalty for the mentally handicapped in 1989, only two states had outlawed the
imposition of the death penalty in addition to the fourteen that then outlawed the
death penalty. 157 In contrast, in 2002 when Atkins reached the high Court,
eighteen states with death penalties outlawed the execution of the mentally
retarded and twelve states had no death penalty at all. Adding these numbers
together, in thirty states a person who committed a capital crime could not be
executed if he were mentally handicapped whereas in twenty states such a person
could be executed. 158 Noting that "it is not so much the number of these states
that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change" and that "even
in those States that allow the execution of mentally retarded offenders, the
practice is uncommon," the Court in an opinion by Justice Stevens joined by six
Justices struck down the execution of the mentally handicapped as being cruel
and unusual. 159 It should be noted that in doing this the Court relied upon a brief
submitted by the European Union that stated that the world community
overwhelmingly regards the execution of the mentally handicapped as being
excessive. 160
I think the Court's analysis in Atkins v. Virginia is essentially sound, but that
the Court ought not to have invalidated the death penalty for the retarded until at
least thirty-eight out of fifty states had rejected it-a three quarters majority.
Rejection by thirty out of fifty states should not have been deemed enough.
Article V clearly says that three-quarters of the states is the consensus required to
adopt a constitutional amendment, and it makes sense to me to use at least this
same number for figuring out when evolving standards of decency have changed
for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. Surely, it is better to use a percentage
153 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.
154 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
155 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977).
156 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-93 (1982).
157 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314.
158 Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 315-16.
160 Id at 316 n.21.
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drawn from the Constitution than for the Court to improvise one. That being said,
I am glad the death penalty for the mentally handicapped is gone, and I have little
doubt given the speed and direction of changes with which states were
disavowing it that it would have been only a matter of time before thirty-eight
states had rejected it.
I should emphasize, however, that while rejection of a punishment by three-
quarters of the states ought to be a necessary condition for finding a violation of
the Eighth Amendment, it ought not to be a sufficient condition. Some states, like
New York in 1905,161 may want to experiment with new laws that have criminal
penalties, or they may want to resurrect old laws with criminal penalties, such as
discouraging doctors from performing abortions. For federalism reasons, those
one or two state experiments should be permitted to go forward, even if three-
quarters of the states do not apply a criminal penalty for that conduct.
How then do these principles from Atkins apply to anti-sodomy statutes
which sometimes carried a penalty as high as twenty years in prison for oral and
anal sex? 162 In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court was confronted by a
situation in which thirty-seven out of the fifty states (one state shy of three-
quarters) had repealed or invalidated their anti-sodomy laws. In the remaining
thirteen states, only four states outlawed exclusively homosexual sodomy while
nine outlawed both gay and straight performance of oral or anal sex. 163 In the
thirteen states without anti-sodomy laws, those laws were rarely and sporadically
enforced and jail-time was a rarity, if it was ever imposed. As I understand it, anti-
sodomy laws were mainly useful to prosecutors in rape cases in which consent
could not be proven, since consent is not defense to prosecution for sodomy.
Against this backdrop, I think a sentence imposing prison time or even a
felony conviction would be cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, but that is not, of course, what petitioners received. Instead,
the petitioners were each fined $200, assessed court costs of $141.25 each, 164
and, having entered a plea of nolo contendere, declared guilty of a class C
misdemeanor placing the petitioners within the registration laws of at least four
states as sex offenders. 165
Without diminishing the significance of petitioners' convictions and trip
through the criminal justice system, I find it impossible to conclude that penalties
this low were "excessive" and therefore cruel and unusual within the meaning of
the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, if a state cannot impose even this minimal
penalty for the ancient Biblical offense of sodomy, then surely it cannot outlaw it
161 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
162 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197-98 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring)
(discussing penalty of up to twenty years in prison).
163 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
'64Id. at 563.
165 Id. at 575.
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altogether as great thinkers from St. Thomas Acquinas on down have thought was
permissible. For federalism reasons, I think it is permissible for the states to
outlaw sodomy so long as a culture war continues in this country over gay rights,
which it very much does at the present time. If that is so, it simply must be the
case that a low fine and class C misdemeanor conviction of the kind issued here is
still permissible. It may well be that in five or ten years even this minimal penalty
for sodomy will be viewed as being excessive, but at least for now, punishments
this minimal cannot be deemed to be cruel and unusual. The Eighth Amendment
argument in Lawrence thus fails. The punishments imposed in this case are
simply too low to be of serious concern.
One might ask, in conclusion, why if I would allow jail penalties in the
context of Lochner in which three-quarters of the states may have disapproved, I
would not allow them here in Lawrence. The difference between Lochner and
Lawrence is that in Lawrence not only are anti-sodomy laws on the way out, they
are also never enforced even where they have been retained. The evidence of
foreign constitutional law cited by the Court is relevant here to the Eighth
Amendment proportionality assessment. I think the fact that anti-sodomy laws are
a relic of the past in the Western World, although not in the Islamic World, is
perhaps one of many factors suggesting that jail time for sodomy in the United
Sates would today be cruel and unusual punishment.
VI. CONCLUSION
We are in the midst of a revolution in public attitudes toward gay rights. How
far this revolution will go no one can say, but it is clearly the case that today most
Americans, myself included, believe that laws against sodomy are an unwise use
of the criminal justice system's scarce law enforcement resources. This is not to
say that all morals laws are necessarily unwise; I strongly support laws against
prostitution, adult incest, and for that matter dueling. Not everything that two
people consent to is okay and ought to be legal. But my policy support for the
repeal of laws against sodomy does not conclude in my mind the constitutional
question of whether anti-sodomy laws violate the Constitution of the United
States. I have reviewed every possible constitutional claim that could have been
or was raised in Lawrence v. Texas, and none of them are meritorious.
Lawrence is now the law of the land and is a precedent that binds the lower
federal courts and future Supreme Courts, but it teaches the erroneous lesson that
silly laws are also always unconstitutional. They are not. That is why it is
critically important to elect good people to state and federal policy-making
offices. In a narrow range of cases, in which the Supreme Court or lower federal
courts engage in reasonableness review, it is appropriate for those judges to rely
on foreign sources of constitutional law. In most cases, and in Lawrence itself,
foreign law ought not to be deemed relevant to constitutional decision making,
except perhaps as to the issue of the proportionality of the criminal punishment.
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Particularly in areas like this where social attitudes are evolving, it is unfortunate
for the courts to step into the fray, become a target, and possibly set back the
social evolution that is occurring.

